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We examine the quantitative impact of the Federal Reserve’s mortgage-backed securities (MBS) purchase
program. We focus on how much of the recent decline in mortgage interest rate spreads can be attributed
to these purchases. The question is more difficult than frequently perceived because of simultaneous
changes in prepayment and default risks.  When we control for these risks, we find evidence of statistically
insignificant or small effects of the program. For specifications where the existence or announcement
of the program appears to have lowered spreads, we find no separate effect of the size of the stock













Estimated Impact of the Fed’s 
Mortgage-Backed Securities Purchase Program 
 






Abstract. We examine the quantitative impact of the Federal Reserve’s mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) purchase program. We focus on how much of the recent 
decline in mortgage interest rate spreads can be attributed to these purchases. The 
question is more difficult than frequently perceived because of simultaneous 
changes in prepayment and default risks.  When we control for these risks, we 
find evidence of statistically insignificant or small effects of the program. For 
specifications where the existence or announcement of the program appears to 
have lowered spreads, we find no separate effect of the size of the stock of MBS 
purchased by the Fed.  
 
 
  Following the steep decline in house prices throughout 2007 and 2008, and the associated 
crisis in the financial system, the Federal Reserve introduced several programs with the aim of 
stabilizing the housing market. Most significantly it established a program to purchase mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) that were guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two 
government sponsored enterprises (GSE) with this role. The program was set up with an initial 
limit of $500bn, but was later expanded to $1.25 trillion. The Fed also created a program to buy 
GSE-debt—initially up to $100bn and later expanded to $200bn—and a program to purchase 
$300bn of medium-term Treasury securities. The Fed’s MBS purchases came on top of an earlier 
announced Treasury MBS purchase program.  
  These programs were introduced with the explicit aim of reducing mortgage interest 
rates.
1 Figure 1 shows both primary and secondary mortgage interest rates spreads over Treasury 
                                                 
* We would like to thank Jim Dignan, Peter Frederico, Frank Nothaft and Josie Smith for helpful comments. 
1 The Press Release on November 25, 2008 announcing the MBS-purchase and GSE-debt purchase programs stated 
that “This action is being taken to reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, 
which in turn should support housing markets and foster improved conditions in financial markets more generally.” 
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yields during the financial crisis.  Primary mortgage rates are the rates that are paid by the 
individual borrower.  They are based on the secondary market rate but also include a fee for the 
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Figure 1: Development of Mortgage Interest Spreads
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  Observe that mortgage spreads over U.S. Treasuries started rising in 2007 and continued 
rising until late 2008 when they reached a peak and started declining.  By July 2009 they had 
returned to their long-run average—or slightly below that average—and then did not move 
significantly further.   Two related questions about these movements in mortgage spreads are 
                                                 
2 The primary market mortgage rate series comes from Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey, which 
surveys lenders each week on the rates and points for their most popular 30-year fixed-rate, 15-year fixed-rate, 5/1 
hybrid amortizing adjustable-rate, and 1-year amortizing adjustable-rate mortgage products. The secondary market 
mortgage is the Fannie Mae MBS 30 Year Current Coupon. The spreads are created by subtracting the yield on 10-
year treasuries from both series. The maturity difference between these series captures the fact that most 30-year 
mortgages are paid-off or refinanced before their maturity. 3 
 
important to address.  First, to what degree can the decline in spreads to their long-run levels in 
2009 be attributed to the purchases of MBS by Fed and Treasury?  Second, could additional 
MBS purchases reduce mortgage spreads further?  These questions are of interest for 
determining whether or not to extend the program.  But they also matter in the long run.  
Determining whether central banks have the ability to affect pricing of mortgage securities for 
extended periods is important input into the debate about the role, responsibilities and powers of 
central banks (see, for example, the collection of essays on this subject in Ciorciari and Taylor, 
2009).   
 
1.  Conventional Wisdom About the Impact of the MBS Purchase Program 
  A common perception is that the MBS purchase program has been successful in reducing 
borrowing costs for home buyers. In January 2009, Ben Bernanke announced in a speech at the 
London School of Economics that  “[…] mortgage rates dropped significantly on the 
announcement of this program and have fallen further since it went into operation.“ A quick 
glance at Figure 2 could support such a claim. The decline in mortgage interest rate spread is 
contemporaneous to the expansion of the MBS purchase program More recently, on December 2, 
2009, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Brian Sack stated that: “The effects on the MBS rate… can be seen most easily in the spread of 
yields on mortgage-backed securities over those on Treasuries, adjusted for the prepayment 
option embedded in those securities. The option-adjusted spread has narrowed by about 100 
basis points since the announcement of the program, with more than half of that decline 
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Figure 2: Mortgage Spreads and Stock of MBS purchases 
 
 
  Others cite the large fraction of new agency-insured MBS issuance that the Fed has 
purchased each month since the start of the purchase program
3. Figure 3 shows that MBS 
purchases in 2009 were between 20 percent and 130 percent of new issuance, and a significantly 
larger fraction of net issuance. 
                                                 
3 This point was made by Brian Sack who asked: “How has the Fed been able to generate these substantial effects on 
longer-term interest rates? One word: size. The total amount of securities to be purchased under the LSAPs is quite 
large relative to the size of the relevant markets. That is particularly the case for mortgage-backed securities. Fed 
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Figure 3: Monthly Flows of MBS Issues and Shares Bought by Fed and Treasury 
 
  However, in our view it is important to determine whether such statements can be 
supported by econometric analysis that controls for influences other than the MBS purchase 
program on mortgage rates. In particular, any coherent story that links the decline in mortgage 
interest rates to the purchases of MBS by the Fed needs to also explain why mortgage spreads 
increased so dramatically between 2007 and late 2008, and consider whether those same factors 
may be responsible for at least part of the subsequent decline in 2009. It is conceivable that 
precisely those indicators of risk in mortgage lending that drove up mortgage spreads through 
2007 and 2008 relaxed throughout the first half of 2009, providing a coherent theory for both the 
rise and the subsequent fall of mortgage spreads, without a large role for the government 
purchases.  6 
 
  In our view, the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee meeting on June 23-24 
2009 set the correct benchmark for analysis:  “The asset purchase programs were intended to 
support economic activity by improving market functioning and reducing interest rates on 
mortgage loans and other long-term credit to households and businesses relative to what they 
otherwise would have been (emphasis added).” Such a comparison requires a statistical 
procedure to determine how interest rates on mortgage are affected by other factors, including 
risks. To control for these risks we use multivariate regression techniques. We focus on 
prepayment risks and default risks as explained below.  
   
2.  Controlling for Prepayment Risk   
  Mortgage-backed securities are structured products that are collateralized by residential 
mortgages. Most of these mortgages entail a prepayment option by the individual borrower, 
which gives the borrower the right to prepay the mortgage at any time prior to the maturity of the 
loan, and thereby to refinance at a favorable rate. This prepayment option gives mortgage-backed 
securities characteristics similar to those of a callable bond in which the issuer has the right to 
redeem prior to its maturity date (Windas, 1996). Pricing of a mortgage-backed security thus 
proceeds by modeling it as a combination of (1) a long position in a non-callable bond and (2) a 
short position in a prepayment option. The combined valuation of those two parts determines the 
secondary market yield of MBS.  
  The value of the prepayment option is determined using standard option-pricing tools, 
where the value of the option depends on expected movements in the short-term interest rate – 
higher volatility in the interest rate will increase the value of the option, since it will increase the 
probability of states in which prepayment becomes optimal. The option-adjusted spread (OAS) is 7 
 
a common way for investors and traders to take account of the prepayment risk. The OAS is the 
spread of the MBS over a term structure of alternative interest rates after controlling for the value 
of the prepayment option. A summary of the OAS calculation is provided in the appendix. 
  Given these considerations we focus on the impact of the MBS purchase program on the 
OAS.  An advantage of the OAS is that the measure directly controls for prepayment risk 
without adding control variables in the statistical analysis. We also examine the impact on the 
primary and secondary market spreads shown in Figures 1 and 2, but in this case it is necessary 
control for prepayment risk indirectly by including other terms in the regressions, such as the 
implied volatility of Treasury yields obtained from options on those securities,
4as in Lehnert, 
Passmore and Sherlund (2006). Higher volatility in Treasury yields would increase prepayment 
risk and thus the primary or secondary mortgage interest rate spread.  
 
3.  Controlling for Default Risk 
  Controlling for default risk of GSE-insured MBS is necessary to ensure that the decline in 
mortgage spreads in 2009 was not driven by a decline in default risk. Finding a good measure for 
default risk, however, is not easy. 
  In the case of GSE-insured MBS, the default risk is related to the default risk of the 
underlying mortgages as well as to the potential of the insuring GSE being unable to meet its 
guarantee obligations. The ability to fulfill its pledge is a function of the health of the housing 
market and of a number of political factors that determine whether the government would 
eventually act as a backstop to GSE-issued guarantees. A good measure of the default risk of 
GSE-insured MBS is the credit default swap (CDS) series on GSE-debt. When there is an 
                                                 
4 Bloomberg Ticker: MOVE.IND - This is a yield curve weighted index of the normalized implied volatility on 1-
month Treasury options.  8 
 
increased risk of default of agency-debt, as measured by higher costs for CDS on that debt, the 
risk that the GSEs will not be able to fulfill their insurance pledge increases, and secondary 
market spreads on agency-insured MBS will increase.  Unfortunately, placing Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac into conservatorship on September 7, 2008 was a trigger-event for outstanding CDS 
so the data series stops at that time, and, to our knowledge, no new CDS series have emerged 
since then that would allow us to directly measure GSE default risk.  
  An alternative proxy for the default risk of Fannie and Freddie is the spread between 
agency-debt and US Treasury securities.  One such series
5 is the spread between 5-year Fannie 
Mae bonds and US Treasury active (on-the-run)
6 securities. Figure 4 shows this bond spread 
series since 2007 together with the associated CDS series prior to its discontinuation
7. For the 
time-period that the two series co-exist, they are highly correlated, which suggests that the bond 
spread series is a good control for the default risk of GSE-insured MBS.  
                                                 
5 Bloomberg Ticker FNMGVN5:IND 5 Year; Robustness checks using the 10-year GSE debt series, 
FNMGVN10:IND, provide very similar results.  
6 If US Treasury actives are not available for the underlying benchmark Fannie Mae term, then the closest to the 
maturity for Fannie Mae is used. 
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Figure 4: GSE bond spreads vs. GSE CDS 
 
A complicating factor however is that in late 2008 the Fed also embarked on a program to 
purchase agency debt. While these interventions capture a much smaller fraction of the market 
than the purchases of agency-insured MBS, they may contaminate the usefulness of bond spreads 
as a pure measure of agency default risk during this period.  To deal with this problem we take 
two approaches.   
First, we instrument for the bond spread series with three instrumental variables: the level 
of the Case-Shiller house price index, the month-on-month change in this index, and Moody’s 
AAA bond index
8.  (We interpolate the monthly Case-Shiller index data to get the weekly 
observations.)  A lower level of the house price index and a large month-on-month decline in the 
index should indicate a higher degree of mortgage risk. Falling house prices will push borrowers 
                                                 
8 Moody's Long-Term Corporate Bond Yield Averages are derived from pricing data on a regularly replenished 
population of corporate bonds in the U.S. market, each with current outstandings over $100 million. The bonds have 
maturities as close as possible to 30 years; they are dropped from the list if their remaining life falls below 20 years, 
if they are susceptible to redemption, or if their ratings change. All yields are yield-to- maturity calculated on a 
semi-annual basis. Each observation is an unweighted average 10 
 
into negative home equity, increasing their incentives for strategic default, and thus increasing 
the risk of mortgage default. The Moody’s AAA bond index captures the general degree of 
riskiness in the credit markets.  Because these instruments are unlikely to be affected by 
government purchases of GSE-debt and are highly correlated with the bond spread (the first 
stage regression has an F-Statistic of 141.16), they are good instruments in our view.  In addition, 
beyond its effect through capturing increased risk in the housing credit market, neither of the 
instruments should have a dramatic effect on the default probability of GSE-debt – thus the 
exclusion restrictions are likely to be met. 
  Second, we use the spreads of Fannie Mae’s Subordinated Benchmark note series to 
proxy for credit risk.  Since the Fed’s GSE-debt purchases are focused on the senior debt market, 
these are less likely to have contaminated this subordinated debt as a proxy of risk. Fannie Mae 
started issuing subordinated debt in 2001, with the expressed goal of “enhancing market 
discipline, transparency and capital adequacy.” The subordinated debt series is unsecured and 
ranks junior in priority of payment to all senior creditors, so “investors considering investing in 
these securities need to closely monitor Fannie Mae’s financial strength, safety and soundness” 
(Fannie Mae, 2001). Since MBS guarantees rank pari passu to senior bonds, the subordinated 
debt will only be repaid if the MBS insurances issued are fulfilled. This means that an increase in 
the subordinated debt spreads could signal an increase in the probability of default for the GSE-
insured MBS, and thus the secondary market mortgage interest rates. The downside of looking at 
the subordinated debt series is its very small volume, which is usually around $1bn per issuance, 
and not comparable in liquidity to the senior GSE bonds. Therefore, the pricing of these 
securities may conflate liquidity elements with credit risk elements. Figure 5 compares the 
development of the bond spread series with the subordinated debt spread series – it appears as if 11 
 
the subordinated debt spread series moves more dramatically, especially in the period running up 
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Figure 5: GSE 5-year bond spread vs. GSE Subordinated debt Spread
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4.  Regression Results with the Option-Adjusted Spread 
  We first regress the option-adjusted spread on the various measures of default risk 
(interest rate spreads on GSE senior debt — with and without instruments — as well as on 
subordinated debt) and the stock of GSE-secured MBS held by Fed and Treasury as a percentage 
of the total market (about $5 trillion). Both the outcome variables and the bond spreads are 
measured in basis points (1/100 of a percentage point). The observations are at a weekly 
                                                 
9 Spread of the Fannie Mae Subordinated Benchmark Series, Maturity on 5.1.2013, Volume: $1bn (Bloomberg 
Ticker: FNMA 4.625 05/01/13 Corp) over 5-year Treasury. 
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frequency; for higher frequency series, we take the observation closest to the beginning of the 
week. The estimation period is the beginning of 2007 to the December 2009. 
  As discussed above, the option-adjusted spread is measured against a term structure of 
interest rates.  The predicted prepayment cash-flows associated with the MBS are discounted 
back to the present using this term structure, and the OAS is the number of basis points that the 
discount curve needs to be adjusted upwards until the theoretical price calculated using the 
“adjusted term structure” matches the market price of the security. It is common to use the 
LIBOR swap curve for this purpose.  LIBOR swap rates are the most appropriate discount rate 
for most financial market actors, since portfolio managers need to balance mortgage investments 
with other non-government investments. The Swap curve provides a measure of the opportunity 
cost of most investors. For example, Fabozzi and Mann (2001) argue that “funded investors use 
LIBOR as their benchmark interest rate. Most funded investors borrow at a spread over LIBOR. 
Consequently, if a yield curve for LIBOR is used as the benchmark interest rate, the OAS 
reflects a spread relative to their funding costs.” Figure 6 shows the OAS using the swap curve, 
which we call Swap-OAS, along with the primary mortgage market spread.  Note that the Swap-
OAS has the same general pattern as the primary mortgage spread, but the gap between them 
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Figure 6: Swap-OAS 
 
The OAS can also be calculated using the Treasury spot curve rather than the LIBOR 
swap curve for the term structure.  Treasury rates and LIBOR have different liquidity and risk 
characteristics and these varied considerably during the financial crisis as Treasury rates deviated 
significantly from LIBOR due in part to a “flight to quality.” (Smith, 2009; Taylor and Williams, 
2008). We consider this alternative measure, which we call Treasury-OAS,
10  as well as the 
Swap-OAS and in our analysis.   
 
 
                                                 
10 For Swap-OAS we use the NOASFNCL series of Bloomberg. For Treasury OAS was use the MOASFNCL series. 
Both series find the OAS of FNMA 30 Year Current Coupon MBS. NOASFNCL uses the S23 Swap curve, 
MOASFNCL uses the Constant Maturity Treasury (CMT) curve for discounting. 
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  In Tables 1 and 2 we report the impact of MBS purchases on the Swap-OAS. We use the 
GSE bond spread series discussed in Section 3 as a measure of the underlying default risk in 
Table 1 and subordinated debt spreads in Table 2.  Recall that we do not need to proxy for 
volatility, because prepayment risk is already removed from the OAS series.  
 
 Table 1: Swap-OAS regressions with GSE bond spreads 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS IV OLS IV 





























Observations  148 143 147 142 
R
2  0.750 0.741 0.836 0.829 
 
 
Observe in Table 1 that the OAS moves closely with the bond spread, just as theory would 
predict. However, the coefficient on the MBS purchase volume is of the wrong sign and 
sometimes insignificant. There is no evidence that the increase in the MBS purchases led to a 








Table 2: Swap-OAS Regressions with Subordinated Debt Spreads 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS IV OLS IV 




















OAS  (t-1) 





Observations  148 143 147 142 
R
2  0.737 0.735 0.810 0.805 
 
  
The regressions in Table 2 control for default risk using the subordinated debt series. 
Here the coefficients on the MBS purchases have the correct sign, but are quite small and 
sometimes statistically insignificant. For example, the coefficient on total MBS purchases in 
column (1) suggests that a purchase of $500 billion in MBS (approximately 10% of the market) 
would reduce the Swap-OAS by about 4 basis points.  Accordingly, the actual total purchases of 
Fed and Treasury up to December 2009 would have contributed a total of 8 basis points to the 
decline in the Swap-OAS.  
  Tables 3 and 4 consider the same regressions as Tables 1 and 2 except that the alternative 
OAS measure, Treasury-OAS, replaces Swap-OAS as the dependent variable. The results show a 
larger and more significant effect of the MBS purchases on the Treasury-OAS. The differences 
in the parameter estimates using the Swap-OAS and the Treasury-OAS are driven by movements 
of the Treasury term structure relative to the swap-curve term structure over the sample period.  
 16 
 
  Table 3: Treasury-OAS Regressions with GSE bond spreads 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS IV OLS IV 































Observations  149 144 149 144 
R
2  0.772 0.759 0.841 0.823 
 
 
Table 4: Treasury-OAS Regressions with Subordinated Debt Spreads 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS IV OLS IV 





























Observations  149 144 149 144 
R




  To understand these differences, it is useful to consider the residuals of regressions of 
Swap-OAS and Treasury-OAS on the bond spread series (the risk indicator), without including 
the MBS purchases as an explanatory variable. Figure 7 shows the residuals from such a Swap-
OAS regression along with the actual and predicted Swap-OAS series over the sample period.  
Notice that the residuals through this whole period remain evenly spread around zero. 
Movements in prepayment risk (as measured by Swap-OAS) and default risk (measure by 
agency debt spreads) explain the major movements in mortgage spreads. Little remains to be 
explained by the MBS purchases. This explains why the coefficient on MBS purchases is very 
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Figure 7: Residual Analysis of Swap-OAS 
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  Figure 8 looks at a similar analysis for the residuals from the alternative Treasury-OAS 
regressions. Here we see that the residuals are below zero for almost all of 2009, which is what is 
being picked up by the MBS purchase coefficient.  More important, however, note that the 
residuals show little trend movement throughout 2009, as the Fed’s and the Treasury’s MBS 
stock continuously grew in size. If the volume of purchases was the driving factor, we would 











07M01 07M07 08M01 08M07 09M01 09M07
Treasury-OAS (Right Axis)
Predicted Treasury-OAS (Right Axis)
Residuals
Basis points Basis points
 
Figure 8: Residual Analysis of Treasury-OAS 
 
Rather, it appears as if there was a single downward shift in residuals near the beginning of the 
MBS purchase program without a further effect from increasing purchases.  
  To formalize this graphical analysis mathematically, we consider OLS regressions which 
include a dummy variable for whether or not there was an MBS purchase program along with the 
variable for the volume of purchases. The results are shown in Table 5. Columns (1) through (3) 19 
 
are the swap OAS regressions corresponding to three different dummy variables: In each 
regression the dummy is set to 0 at the start of the sample period and then increased to 1 at a later 
date. In column (1) the dummy is set to 1 starting in September 2008 when the Treasury started 
buying MBS. In column (2) the dummy is set to 1 starting in January 2009 when the Fed 
purchases of MBS started. In column (3) the dummy is set to 1 starting with the announcement 
of the Fed’s MBS purchase program on November 25, 2008.  As suggested by the residual 
analysis in Figure 7, neither the program’s existence nor the volume of purchases has a 
statistically significant effect on the Swap-OAS. The coefficients are insignificant or of the 
wrong sign. 





























































(3.80)     -30.46 
(4.45)    
MBS Fed 
Dummy    8.81 
(4.84)     -28.54 




   9.47 
(4.01)     -27.47 
(4.93) 
Number of 
Observations  148 148  148  149  149 149 
R
2  0.746 0.751  0.760  0.828 0.80  0.813 
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  Columns (4) through (6) of Table 5 show the same three regressions for the alternative 
Treasury-OAS measure. These regressions show that the existence or the announcement of the 
MBS purchase program reduced the Treasury-OAS by about 30bps. However, the actual volume 
of the MBS held by Fed and Treasury has no additional statistically significant effect on the 
Treasury-OAS.   
  One explanation of the difference between the effect of the program’s existence or 
announcement and the effect of the volume of purchases is that the program signaled that 
implicit Federal government guarantees of the GSEs had become explicit. If investors believed 
that the government would always bail out Fannie and Freddie, despite the lack of explicit “full 
faith and credit” insurance, the mortgage spreads over Treasuries would not have increased in 
2007 and 2008 nor have remained high after the Federal government takeover. The fact that 
spreads were positive suggests that market participants attached some likelihood to the 
government not bailing out Fannie and Freddie (in addition to some differences in the liquidity 
of the two instruments). By directly purchasing GSE-debt and GSE-insured MBS, the Fed 
increased its own financial exposure to the GSEs, increasing the perception that the guarantee 
was explicit. However, if this were the channel through which the MBS-purchases and GSE-debt 
purchases affected mortgage spreads, a significantly more straightforward way to achieve the 
same goal would be to extend, formally and explicitly, the full faith and credit of the United 
States to Fannie and Freddie, in a similar fashion as it is already extended to Ginnie Mae.  
 
5.  Regression Results with Primary and Secondary Market Mortgage Spreads 
In this section we report the results from the regression analysis using the primary or 
secondary mortgage interest rate spread as a dependent variable. As discussed above since these 21 
 
spreads are not adjusted for prepayment risk it is necessary use some proxy for prepayment risk 
in the regression, and we use the implied volatility of Treasury yields obtained from options. A 
residual analysis similar to that for the OAS for primary and secondary market mortgage spreads 
shows that the volume of purchases has little or no additional effect beyond the existence of the 
program. Therefore, we simply use program dummies and estimate the size and quantitative 
significance of the program.  
  Table 6 examines the primary mortgage spread using the GSE bond spread series as the 
proxy for default risk. Observe that higher GSE bond spreads, indicating larger MBS default 
risk, are associated with higher primary mortgage spreads.  The regression coefficient is 
reasonably close to unity. A higher implied volatility, the prepayment risk proxy, is also 
associated with higher mortgage interest rates, as predicted by the theory. The coefficients on the 
various program dummies are small and often statistically insignificant.  
Table 6: Primary Mortgage Spread Regressions with GSE bond spreads 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 





























(6.50)      
MBS Fed Dummy      -13.37 
(5.37) 
-12.60 
(6.35)    
MBS Fed Announce 





Observations  152 144 152 144 152 144 
R
2  0.667 0.638 0.677 0.657 0.665 0.647 
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The regressions in Table 7 show the effects of purchases on primary mortgage rates, but 
control for the GSE-default risk with the subordinated debt spread rather than the senior GSE-
debt spread.  Using this risk measure, we obtain estimates of the effects of MBS purchase 
program which are similar in size to the case of Treasury OAS—a reduction of the primary 
mortgage rate spread of approximately 30bps due to the MBS purchase program.  
 
Table 7: Primary Mortgage Spread Regressions with Subordinated Debt Spreads 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 





























(5.25)      
MBS Fed Dummy      -34.69 
(3.94) 
-37.28 
(4.38)    
MBS Fed Announce 





Observations  152 144 152 144 152 144 
R
2  0.714 0.700 0.753 0.748 0.700 0.679 
 
  Finally, Tables 8 and 9 show the impact of MBS purchases on secondary mortgage 
spreads.  These are the secondary market yields on GSE-insured mortgage-backed securities. 23 
 
 
Table 8: Secondary Mortgage Spread Regression with GSE bond spreads 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 





























(4.57)      
MBS Fed Dummy      -35.48 
(3.15) 
-37.02 
(3.71)    
MBS Fed Announce 





Observations  152 144 152 144 152 144 
R
2  0.861 0.842 0.850 0.832 0.832 0.811 
 
The effect of MBS purchase program on the secondary market spread shown in Table 8 are 
slightly higher than the effect on primary market spreads shown in Table 6. Of all the results 
reported in this paper the largest effects are Table 9 where we used the subordinated debt as the 
proxy for risk.  Comparing Tables 8 and 9 with Tables 6 and 7 suggests that this reduction in 
secondary market funding costs for mortgage lenders was only partially passed on to consumers 
in terms of lower primary mortgage rates. Observe that using the IV approach gives effects of the 
MBS-purchases of a larger magnitude than the OLS approach  24 
 
 
Table 9: Secondary Mortgage Spread Regression with Subordinated Debt Spreads 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 





























(3.73)      
MBS Fed Dummy      -55.25 
(2.91) 
-56.81 
(3.22)    
MBS Fed Announce 





Observations  152 144 152 144 152 144 
R
2  0.805 0.783 0.817 0.796 0.831 0.813 
 
6. Conclusion 
  In this paper we endeavored to estimate the quantitative impact of the Federal Reserve’s 
Mortgage Backed Securities Purchase program on mortgage interest rates using a multivariate 
statistical framework which takes account of other possible influences on rates.  We focused on 
two other possible influences: changes in prepayment risk and changes in default risk.  Our 
results can be summarized as follows: 
o  Using conventional optional adjusted spreads (OAS) based on LIBOR swaps to 
control for prepayment risks, we find that the MBS program has no significant 
effect. Movements in prepayment risk and default risk explain virtually all of the 
movements in mortgage spreads. In particular, the declines in the OAS that have 25 
 
occurred during the period of the MBS program can be better explained by a 
general decline in risk.  
o  A more significant effect on mortgage spreads—about 30 basis points—can be 
found if one uses an alternative measure of OAS based on the Treasury yield 
curve, but even with this measure the volume of purchases has no effect over and 
above the mere existence of the program.  In other words the impact has not 
increased with the additional purchases of MBS since the start of the program.   
The higher estimated impact of Treasury-OAS compared with Swap-OAS is 
related to movements in the so called TED spread between LIBOR and Treasury 
rates which is unrelated to the MBS program. 
o  Estimating the impact using indirect methods to control for prepayment risk 
generally confirms the analysis using OAS, but shows larger effects in the 
secondary market. The impact of the program on primary market spreads ranges 
from the wrong sign and insignificant to around 30 basis points.  For secondary 
market rates the impact is larger—in the 30 to 60 basis point range—which 
corresponds to a less than full pass through of the impact to primary mortgage 
spreads. In general we find somewhat smaller effects when we control for default 
risk using senior agency debt than we do with subordinated agency debt or 
instrumental variables.  
 
We emphasize that analyzing the effectiveness of the MBS purchase program is very 
difficult. The creation of adequate counterfactuals is complicated by the simultaneous 
government interventions in a large number of markets. Furthermore, the conservatorship-status 26 
 
of the GSEs has contaminated many of the relevant GSE-default risk proxies that are most 
important to control for when analyzing the development of spreads on GSE-insured MBS. Our 
analysis has used a variety of different approaches to proxy for risk, each with its own problems. 
However, none of the approaches reported in this paper, nor others we examined — such as 
CDS-series for the largest mortgage lenders such as Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citi and JP 
Morgan —  provides evidence that the volume of MBS purchases is contributing in a major way 
to the decline in mortgage interest rates.  
Currently there is a lack of publicly-available statistical studies on the effectiveness of the 
Fed’s program.  We note that our estimates of the impact are much smaller than the impacts 
reported in the recent speech by Sack (2009).  While this paper is certainly not the final word on 
the program’s effectiveness, our empirical results raise questions about the ability of central 
banks to conduct price-keeping operations reliably by increasing and decreasing asset purchases 
in particular markets.  They also raise doubts about the benefits in terms of lower mortgage 
interest rates of further increases in the size of the Fed’s MBS portfolio or about the costs in 
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Appendix – A primer on OAS valuation
11 
  MBS are an example of a non-bullet fixed income security that has a payment stream 
which is dependent on the level of the prevailing interest rate. Provisions allowing for borrower 
prepayment prior to the maturity of a loan are referred to as embedded options. In the case of 
MBS, when interest rates decline, mortgage holders might choose to prepay their mortgage and 
refinance at lower rates. This terminates the investors’ source of above-market returns, and 
requires them to reinvest at lower prevailing rates. To compensate the investor for the presence 
of this prepayment option, coupon payments on MBS must be adjusted upwards. 
  The pricing of mortgages and mortgage-backed securities is typically done using Monte 
Carlo methods. Multiple possible interest rate scenarios are generated using a stochastic interest 
rate process. Under the equivalent martingale approach, a stochastic path of interest rates is 
calibrated that eliminates arbitrage opportunities with respect to the observed term structure (in 
the econometric analysis above, we consider both Treasury CMT and LIBOR Swap curves). 
Along each interest rate path, a prepayment model generates cash flows as a function of the 
simulated interest levels
12. For an overview of possible prepayment models, see Spahr and 
Sunderman (1994). Therefore, OAS calculations are necessarily dependent on the interest rate 
model and the prepayment model used. The projected cash flows from the MBS in every state 
are then discounted backwards using the appropriate interest rate. The OAS is the spread over the 
chosen yield curve that equates the PV generated using the adjusted yield curve to the market 
price of the security. 
                                                 
11 This Appendix is based heavily on Kupiec and Kah (1999) and Windas (1996) 
12 In reality, the exercise of the prepayment option is also dependent on factors other than the interest rate, such as 
seasonality and trends in home prices, etc.  30 
 
To show this formally, let {rit} represent the development of interest rates in time t on path i. Let 
{Cit} represent the anticipated cash-flows in each period t on path i. Cit is determined using the 
prepayment model. The present value of the cash-flows for each path i is given by: 
 
      
 




The option-adjusted spread (OAS) is then derived by comparing the market price of an MBS, 
PM, to PE. In particular, it is calculated as the spread over the term structure that equates the 
market price to the (weighted) average present value of expected cash flows over all simulated 
paths. More formally, the OAS is defined as the θ such that: 
 
 